I. INTRODUCTION
Public key cryptography is a main area in the cryptography. In this area each user has a private key and the corresponding public key. The main problem in these cryptosystems is how establishing a link between user's identity (ID) and her/his public key. A general solution for this problem is based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), defined in ISO/IEC 9594-8 [14] , in this solution a trust authority, called Certificate Authority (CA), issues a certificate contained user's ID and user's public key signed with the private key of CA.
Because of issuing and using the certificate are costly, other solutions as Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) have been proposed. The IBC idea first was proposed by Shamir in 1984 [18] . In an IBC system user's ID is considered as her/his public key and the user's private key is generated by a trust authority, called Key Generation Center (KGC) or Private Key Generation (PKG). The main advantage of the IBC systems is that unlike PKI systems, issuing a certificate for each user isn't needed because there is a inherent link between user's ID and her/his public key. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of IBC systems is that the KGC knows the user's private key and subsequently he may impersonate users or a user may deny what he had done with his own private key (e.g. signing a message). This property is called key escrow. For obtaining more information about IBC systems the reader may refer to [3, 8, 9, 11] .
To solve the key escrow problem in IBC, researchers have proposed two types of solutions. In the one solution, the user's private key is split to two parts such that the KGC is just allowed to escrow the one part, for instance [1, 2, 12] . In the other solution, the KGC is split to multiple KGCs such that each of them is allowed to escrow a part of the user's private key and multiple contributions of KGCs are used to create the user's private key, for example [6, 7, 10] .
One of the solutions that split user's private key is called certificateless public key cryptosystem that proposed by AlRiyami and Paterson [1] in 2003. In this cryptosystem, the private key consists of two parts which one of them is made by the user and the other is made by KGC. Up to now, various types of certificateless cryptographic primitives as encryption functions [20] , signature schemes [21] , key agreement protocols [19] and so on, have been designed.
In this paper, we proposed a certificateless authenticated multiple-key agreement protocol with bilinear pairings. Up to now many certificateless key agreement protocols and many multiple-key agreement protocols have independently been proposed but to the best of our knowledge, the proposed protocol is the first protocol that combines multiple-key agreement idea with certificateless cryptosystem. Multiple-key agreement protocols that conformed to the idea of MQV [17] protocol, not using hash function, was introduced by Harn and Lin [13] in 1998.
A. Security Properties of Key Agreement Protocols
The most important security properties of key agreement protocols [5] are indicated in the following. Let that A and B are two participants who are intended to agree on a secret key after executing a key agreement protocol.
• • Implicit key confirmation: A key agreement protocol has this property if the both participants are assured that only the other participant can compute the secret common key.
• Explicit key confirmation: This means that the both participants are assured that the other participant have computed the secret common key. Efficiency is a main factor for key agreement protocols. The efficiency is evaluated by computation and communication cost in a key agreement protocol. The computation cost is dependent to the amount of calculation done by each participant and communication cost is obtained by exchanged message during a key agreement protocol run. So designer of key agreement protocols are willing to design secure and efficient key agreement protocols.
B. Bilinear Pairings

Let 1
G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime n and 2 G is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order n . Let the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in both 1 G and 2 G is hard. An bilinear pairing is a map
, which satisfies the following three properties:
• Bilinear: The BDH problem is no harder than either the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP) or the finite field Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) (Lemma IX.23. of [4] ).
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we will propose a novel multiple key agreement protocol that, same to Harn-Lin scheme, doesn't use of hash function for construction of digital signature. The proposed scheme also is based on certificateless public key cryptosystem, and has three phases that are coming in the following.
A. Setup Phase
In this phase, Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses below items:
• Elliptic curve E over finite field q F , where q is a power of a prime number, by using his private key as follow: of the discrete logarithm problem assumption, the proposed protocol satisfies perfect forward secrecy.
• Key Escrow: The key escrow property in the certificateless key agreement protocols means that the Key Generation Center (KGC) who has the part of the users' private key cannot obtain session keys established between the users. In the proposed scheme the session keys are made only using random numbers, so KGC cannot obtain these keys whereas he knows the part of the users' private key. The computations of the proposed protocol for every entity are shown in the Table I. Our protocol is designed to establish 2 n session keys for n random numbers. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a certificateless authenticated multiple-key agreement protocol with bilinear pairing. The proposed protocol is the first protocol that combines multiple-key agreement idea with certificateless idea. Like Harn-Lin's scheme the proposed scheme does not apply a one-way hash function for construction of the signature. We showed that our protocol satisfies all required security properties of key agreement protocols.
